The neural networks have been utilized in on-line monitoring-system of High Temperature Engineering Tested Reactor (HTTR) with thermal power of 30MW. In this system, several neural networks can independently model the plant dynamics with different architecture, input and output signals and learning algorithm. Monitoring task of each neural network is also different, respectively. Those parallel method applications require distributed architecture of computer network for performing real-time tasks. One of main task is real-time plant monitoring by Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) in auto-associative mode, which can model and estimate the whole plant dynamics by training normal operational data only. The basic principle of the anomaly detection is to monitor the difference between process signals measured from the actual plant and the corresponding values estimated by MLP. Other tasks are on-line reactivity prediction, reactivity and helium leak monitoring, respectively. From the on-line monitoring results at the safety demonstration tests, each neural network shows good prediction and reliable detection performances.
Introduction
Real time condition monitoring at all over nuclear power plants is one of great important tasks for reactor safety and maintenance. Various monitoring methods may exist in nuclear power plants in last several decades; such as physical modeling of plant components, expert system, fuzzy logic, artificial neural networks, genetic algorithm, etc. Although the basics of those techniques originate in simple function of human or animal systems, they exhibit a surprising number of characteristics and are sometimes more useful than conventional statistical techniques. Recently, it is said that those useful techniques should be integrated into condition monitoring system to improve accuracy and reliability of plant diagnosis (1) .
In those techniques, we especially have been developed monitoring systems using neural networks. Neural network can precisely model the system dynamics by using previous operation data only without any physical knowledge about the objective system. On-line entire plant monitoring system with a neural network worked successfully at a PWR plant in the Netherlands, and could detect unusual operation mode (2) . Furthermore, it was clear that the neuro-expert system, which is the combination of a neural network and a expert system, could detect and diagnose symptom of anomalies much earlier than the conventional alarm system from the results by using PWR simulator (3) . Real-time monitoring system with a neural network was also tested at the research reactor in Indonesia (4) .
In this study, we tried to develop more integrated monitoring system in which several neural networks connect in parallel and work for different monitoring purpose independently. This integrated system was applied to the high temperature engineering test reactor (HTTR) in JAPAN. Helium gas is used for primary coolant through the co-axial double pipe in HTTR. The high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) technology is now being established through the accumulation of the operation experience and various test data of the HTTR (5) . As the reactor characteristic is different from existing light water reactors, the real-time plant monitoring for HTTR is very important during various test operations which are much severer than the usual operation at commercial power plants.
Time Synchronizing Signal Recurrent Neural Network (TSS-RNN) (6) and Time Delay
Jordan Recurrent Neural Network (TDJ-RNN) (7) are utilized for reactivity prediction and estimation. MLP with context units is used for reactivity monitoring. Then, overall plant condition monitoring is performed by an auto-associative MLP. At the same time, helium leakage detection technique by a neural network is also considered. The overview of integrated monitoring system is shown in Fig. 1 . 
HTTR Plant
The HTTR was constructed to establish the technology basis for the high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) and develop the technology for high temperature heat applications. The HTTR is a helium-cooled and graphite-moderated HTGR with a thermal power of 30 MW and a maximum reactor outlet coolant temperature of 950 °C (5) . Figure 2 schematically depicts the main cooling system of the HTTR, which is composed of a primary cooling system, a secondary helium cooling system and a pressurized water cooling system. Since 2002, safety demonstration tests simulating anticipated operational occurrences such as decrease of primary coolant flow-rate and reactivity insertion have been carried out to ensure safety during off-normal conditions. In addition, a hydrogen production test facility will be coupled with the HTTR by 2015 to produce hydrogen by nuclear.
The safety demonstration tests are conducted to demonstrate inherent safety features of the HTGRs as well as to obtain the core and plant transient data for validation of safety analysis codes and for establishment of safety design and evaluation technologies of the HTGRs (8) .
The safety demonstration tests are divided into two phases. In the first phase of the safety demonstration tests, anticipated operational occurrences simulation tests without a reactor scram will be conducted. These tests consist of "reactivity insertion test-control rod withdrawal test," and "coolant flow reduction test." The second phase tests will simulate accidents such as a depressurization accident (loss of coolant accident).
In the "reactivity insertion test," a central pair out of 16 pairs of control rods is withdrawn and a reactivity insertion event without scram is simulated. Central control rod (C-CR) withdrawals until 20 mm, 30 mm and 40 mm at power level of 24MW (see Table 1 ) (9) . The tests adopted two withdrawal speeds; slow mode (about 1.45 mm/s) and fast mode (more than 3.8 mm/s). The power control system was not operating during reactivity insertion tests. Actually, TSS-RNN, TDJ-RNN and auto-associative MLP were applied on-line in those demonstration tests. The "coolant flow reduction test" is composed of "partial loss of coolant flow test," and "gas circulators trip test." In the "partial loss of coolant flow test," primary coolant flow rate is slightly reduced by the control system of the primary coolant flow rate with the reactor outlet coolant temperature control system being in operation. In the "gas circulators trip test," the primary coolant flow rate is reduced to 67 and 33% of the rated flow by stopping one or two out of the three gas circulators at the primary pressurized water cooler without initiating a reactor scram. Most of those tests at 9, 18, 24 and 30MW were already finished (9) , and only four cases as shown in Table 2 are used in this paper. 
On-line Data Acquisition system
On a monitoring system as executing several complicated applications, the consistency of real time processing may be impaired because of heavy computation tasks. However, those capabilities could not be accomplished by hardware upgrading only. Therefore, a new integrated monitoring system scheme based on distributed architecture is proposed for a real-time application to HTTR. Each monitoring task is assigned to client PCs by the main server PC.
The integrated system monitors 32 channel signals, which are most important signals for reactivity prediction and plant condition monitoring. Those signals are selected with operators, and described in Table 3 . The 32 signals from HTTR are digitized, and then recorded on the memory and hard disk on the main server every second. At the same time, the main server distributed those data to client PCs with TCP-IP technology. However, only blue colored 16 signals in Table 3 could actually be utilized in this study, because the safety demonstration tests were performed during single operation mode, in which only Primary PWC is worked for reactor cooling.
Neural Networks for Reactivity and Reactor Power Prediction
The two types of neural networks are applied to reactivity and reactor power determination during the C-CR withdrawal tests. Both neural networks learn previous C-CR withdrawal test data at 9, 15 and 18 MW, and then predict the dynamic behavior at 24 MW. It is commonly said that the extrapolation problem as this application is very difficult for neural networks.
TSS-RNN is used for reactivity prediction with the signals of C-CR position (ch.20), core inlet (ch.5) temperature, core outlet temperatures (ch.6) and time synchronized signal (TSS), which is more efficient for extrapolation problem. TSS equation could be described below:
Where t is time operation, t 0 is initial time, a TSS is normalized number, and b TSS is bias parameter. TSS is a signal to give the information about time progression for the network it is useful to efficiently deal with time series data with a comparatively small network. The recurrent feedback connections from the output signals of reactivity and power to hidden layer are also useful for accurate prediction.
On the other hands, TDJ-RNN estimates reactivity and reactor power in real time. The architecture with Jordan type (10) feedback connection utilizes the information of previous C-CR positions (ch.20) and reactor power (ch.17) as the inputs. The special preprocessing of initial power level (ch.21) enhanced to follow the extrapolation of power. At six cases of reactivity insertion tests in Table 1 , TSS-RNN and TDJ-RNN could predict the dynamic behaviors of reactivity and reactor power exactly (7) . Figure 3 shows the on-line display of reactivity prediction by TDJ-RNN at C-CR withdrawal tests case-5. When the program starts, TDJ-RNN receives operation data from the data acquisition system every second, then predicts and displays reactivity and reactor power signal. Furthermore, the TSS-RNN precisely predicted the signals in next 30 seconds when the C-CR stopped. Therefore, we could know the peak and settled values of reactivity and reactor power beforehand. 
Neural Network for Reactivity Monitoring
Reactivity signal is one of the most important signals to monitor plant condition in real time. The input signals of MLP are previous control rod positions, previous reactor power, temperatures, integrated reactor power, etc. as shown in Table 4 . The previous points of "Change of C-CR position" or "Change of Neutron Flux" signals were calculated the correlation with reactivity, and most influenced points were carefully selected as inputs of neural network. The output is reactivity signal only. Those input and output signals could reduce the noises by using context units (10) , and enhance the accuracy of modeling. The output of context unit C n is defined as
Here, x n is input signal and γ n is time delay factor, which depends on the kind of signal and is determined experimentally as shown in Table 4 . Figure 4 shows the schematic model of MLP with context units. This neural network learned the startup operation data in 2005, and then tested the operation data during the safety demonstration tests in 2006. The off-line results show that the neural network can estimate reactivity correctly and detect the abnormal condition with reactivity signal during the control rod withdrawal tests. Figure 5 shows one of the monitoring results during reactivity insertion tests. The deviation of reactivity signal exceeded the fault severity level several seconds after C-CR withdrawal started, and the neural network could easily detect the anomaly of reactivity signal. 
Output signal

Neural Network for Overall Monitoring
Real time condition monitoring all over nuclear power plant is one of great important tasks for reactor safety and maintenance. Therefore, we have already developed on-line monitoring system for PWR and a research reactor. The monitoring system with same type of neural network is also applied to HTTR in this study. Figure 6 shows the schematic model of auto-associative MLP used here. The MLP has three layers; input layer, one hidden layer and output layer. Most of available monitoring signals are selected as inputs and outputs, which are 15 channels described in Table 5 . A hidden layer has 10 units. The output signals are exactly same as the input signals in auto-associative mode.
There are two learning stages for this application. Typical normal operational patterns are trained at the initial learning stage. Then the neural network adaptively trains on-line data if the data is deemed as normal. The backpropagation learning algorithm (11) is used for both learning stages. The concept of anomaly detection is to monitor the difference between measured signals and estimated values by the neural network that is modeled with normal operation data only. Therefore, the difference must be larger if some kind of abnormal condition is occurred in the plant. During the initial learning, the neural network trained the typical normal operational patterns over the wide power range, which are recorded during the startup operation from 10% to 90% in 2005 and the power decrease operation from 100% to 80% in 2006. The number of patterns for the initial learning was 2435, and the learning was repeated 1000 times per each pattern. The patterns were given randomly within each learning cycle. It took about 3 minutes on a PC for initial learning. On the other hands, calculation time for testing and adaptive learning is less than 1 second. It is short enough for real-time application because time interval of testing data from the data acquisition system is 2 seconds. Figure 7 shows initial learning result of reactor power signal. Estimated values (red line) are almost same measured signals (blue line) after initial learning. The deviation, difference between two, is indicated with green line. The maximum errors (ε max ) were finally less than satisfied levels as shown in Table 5 , because most of them are almost comparable to the noise levels. From these results, the neural network could simulate the plant dynamics precisely.
After the initial learning, the fault severity level (ε f ) is defined as follows; ε f =1.25•ε max Here, the coefficient, 1.25, is selected from the experience in PWR. The plant is considered as normal when the difference between measured signals and estimated values are small enough. If one of the differences exceeds the fault severity level, the monitoring system gives alarm immediately.
From the point of view of condition monitoring, reactivity insertion test can be regarded as some kind of anomalies. Therefore, overall monitoring system using MLP easily detected these anomalies within a few seconds after C-CR withdrawal started in all six cases as shown in Table 1 . The signals of reactor power, Primary PWC water inlet temperature and helium gas cooling pump rotation rate exceeded the threshold levels. The monitoring result of reactor power signal in case 5 is shown in Fig. 8 . Blue line indicates measured signal and pink line indicates estimated value, respectively. Green line shows the diagnosis result. When the difference between measured and estimated values exceeds the threshold level, the diagnosis result becomes "one". It is clear that the diagnosis result became "one" in all six cases but returned to "zero" within one minute, because the plant condition return to be stable. Table 2 shows all of the on-line results in coolant flow reduction tests. In case 1 or 3 in Table 2 , 2% of Primary coolant flow rate is slightly reduced by the control system of the primary coolant flow rate at 24 MW. Overall monitoring system immediately detected this anomaly with the signals of Primary PWC helium flow rate, Primary PWC water inlet pressure and others. Figure 9 shows the monitoring result of Primary PWC water inlet pressure signal in case 1. It took only 4 seconds after coolant flow reduction started. Then, the diagnosis result is continuously indicated "abnormal" until primary coolant flow rate recovered by the control system several hours later. Because all of the control systems were operating, the plant status was clearly shifted from normal operation condition. The monitoring system could also detect the anomaly within 2 seconds in 2% of Primary coolant flow rate reduction test case at full power 30 MW operation. On the other hands, two of the three gas circulators at the primary pressurized water cooler were stopped in case 2 or 4 in Table 2 . As this anomaly is much larger than previous cases, overall monitoring system immediately could detect it with most of signals. The monitoring system also shows the same performance at the same test at 30MW.
The main display, schematics with diagnosis results, is shown in Fig. 10 . The measured signals and estimated values are compared on the screen. On-line trend graph of reactivity signal is shown in Fig. 11 . Every signal can be selected. At the same time, the error messages were also displayed on the screen and recorded in a log file, so that we can analyze the plant condition in detail later. 
Conclusions
Integrated plant monitoring system using several neural networks has been developed for HTTR. Each neural network has different purpose, architecture and modeling. Off-line and On-line test results show that each neural network could model the plant dynamics precisely, and detect abnormal conditions immediately during safety demonstration tests. This monitoring system will be applied not only to the next safety demonstration tests but also to on-line operator support continuously. Furthermore, the increase of monitoring signals and neural networks are considered at the next step.
